The global financial and economic crisis highlights the need for effective means of coordinating complementary national policy responses into workable international action. This seems to me to require in turn an international financial architecture that emphasizes the sustainability of national and cross-border financial institutions, instruments and regulations. The international financial architecture needs a major infusion of transparency and forward-looking regulatory practices. Neither will be simple to conceptualise or implement.
We also need multilateral institutions that have clear mandates, the right tools, and appropriate financial and human capital. This is as true of our regional development banks as it is of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Our multilateral institutions have been left to atrophy – they no longer have the financial muscle or the powers of moral suasion to deliver or commit on comprehensive and global development efforts. Given the skewed nature of the governance structures of these institutions, we have warned for several years now that we run the risk of damaging the capability of these institutions, both in terms of their technical capacity and moral injunction.
This needs to change, and it may be that the present crisis has helped to raise consciousness sufficiently to have more serious discussions about how to scale-up the resources available. The Fund and the Bank should have the capacity to help donors to recommit to their aid pledges, to sustain infrastructure investment, and to ensure accessible emergency financing arrangements for poorer countries. In this regard, I welcome the decision by the G-20 to provide greater resources to these institutions to ensure that they can support sovereign economies, especially developing ones. In addition, we must address the issue of how these institutions are governed and managed. If they are to be truly multilateral institutions, then this must be reflected in their governance arrangements and in their management.
The coordinated nature of monetary and now fiscal responses by governments is a sign of our interdependence and growing maturity to tackle problems collectively. Nevertheless, we still have to create the environment where mutual accountability is fostered. The true test is whether we can convince a country to change its course of action because it would benefit the world economy, even though it may not benefit that particular country. Given what we’ve experienced during the growth of economic imbalances, we are still not yet at that level.
In the post-Bretton Woods era we have lost sight of the implicit multilateralism and mutual accountability of the previous system. We do not necessarily need a system of agreed rules to resurrect those needed qualities, but we do need an international commitment. We might call it a strong form of peer review, or it might be less formally a serious commitment to transparent, public and meaningful dialogue between countries. The communication needs to encompass our common financial and economic challenges and the ways in which national policies and regulatory systems sometimes create negative spillovers, financial inconsistencies, or other types of economic imbalance.
Getting these three aspects of the international economic environment right will help to safeguard the economic progress made by developing economies and emerging markets.
Let the light shine in!
I wholeheartedly agree with Trevor Manuel when he says “The international financial architecture needs a major infusion of transparency and forward-looking regulatory practices”.
In Against the Gods Peter L. Bernstein (John Wiley & Sons, 1996) wrote that the boundary between the modern times and the past is the mastery of risk, since for those who believe that everything was in God’s hands, risk management, probability, and statistics, must have seemed quite irrelevant.
But, when the bank regulators in the Basel Committee, and their friends, thought themselves to be so much above all that they could act like God and imposed, by means of the minimum capital requirements for banks, based on a vaguely defined concept of risk, their particular views on risks, and placed so much faith into the credit rating agencies as their supreme risk sentries, they then took us all back to the dark ages.
Have you seen anything more dark-aged than how the world's financial elite en masse followed the triple-As over the cliff of the lousily awarded mortgages to the subprime sector?
If we are going to recapture the enlightenment the world so much needs our multilateral institutions have to be out there on the battlefields, in the sun, instead of cuddling up in their headquarters strategizing in splendid and irrelevant isolation.
The Basel Committee, the Global Stability Forum and the International Monetary Fund, together with most of the central bankers of the world have enjoyed a period of amazing independence with almost no questioning of their actions. Much good did come out of it, we should try to preserve it, but much damage was also produced, and we need to correct that.
In order to get out of the crisis and not dig ourselves deeper in the hole, there are two questions that I personally would like a transparent and forward looking World Bank, and IMF, to urgently analyze.
What is the purpose of our commercial banks? They must mean more than safe mattresses where to stash away our savings.
What has consumer debt to do in developing countries? Does it help to enrich its poor people or does it help to keep them poor?